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The Intuitive Criterion / Cheap talk / Nash equilibrium / Solution concept / Equilibrium selection / Sequential equilibrium / Strategy / Strategic dominance / Outcome / Game theory / Problem solving / Signaling game


Meaning and Credibility in Experimental Cheap-Talk Games∗ Ernest K. Lai Department of Economics Lehigh University [removed]
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Document Date: 2015-02-05 20:46:05

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City

Kowloon / /

Company

Game 1 / /

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Facility

Economics The Hong Kong University of Science / LSK Business Building / Rutgers University / Hong Kong University of Science / /

NaturalFeature

Clearwater Bay / /

Organization

HKUST Department of Economics / Hong Kong University of Science and Technology / Experimental Cheap-Talk Games∗ Ernest K. Lai Department / Lehigh University / Xiamen University / Rutgers University / Research Grants Council of Hong Kong / /

Person

Syng-Joo Choi / Navin Kartik / Kim / Cai / Joel Sobel / Rabin / A. Once / Andreas Blume / Barry Sopher / Serra Garcia / Wang / /

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Position

player / Porter / Corresponding author / /

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